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21 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to provide a theoretical and empirical review of TMT composition research. This research is
theoretically inspired by the old tradition of group dynamics research (e.g. Lewin, 1948; 1951) and later insights into the effects
managers have in shaping the course and fates of organisations (e.g. Child, 1972). Throughout this paper we will develop a
conceptual model linking team composition, behaviour and results. The paper is structured as follows. First, in section 2, we
introduce the theoretical background of present TMT composition studies and their theoretical antecedents in the decision-
making insights of the Carnegie School, strategic choice theory and group dynamics. A model is presented that underlies so-
called upper echelons research into the effect of TMT composition on organisational outcomes. We will describe the kinds of
variables typically used in upper echelons studies to characterize a team: team averages and team variety. A major theoretical
debate will then be introduced on the different effects of member variety in a team. Based on this discussion we will make a first
refinement to the original upper echelons model. Next, in section 3, we give a summary of empirical research into team
composition variables that have received most attention in TMT studies so far, such as averages and spreads in age, tenure and
educational or functional background. Section 4 provides a critical discussion of the empirical findings in relation to the model
and identifies some theoretical and empirical shortcomings in the research carried out so far. From this discussion a final
analytical model is derived for studying TMT composition, strategic choices, processes and results.
2 Theoretical background
2.1 Origins and development of the upper echelons model
Although group dynamics research has a long history in social psychology, the systematic linking of characteristics of a group of
top managers [the top management team (TMT)] to organisational results was only started in the first half of the 1980s. In their
seminal paper, Hambrick and Mason (1984: 193) argued for "[a] new emphasis in macro-organisational research: an emphasis
on the dominant coalition of the organisation, in particular its top managers". Their call was followed by a large number of TMT
studies. However, the claim that studying the role of the dominant organisational coalition would be a worthwhile undertaking
was by no means new.
Based upon the theorists of the Carnegie School (Cyert and March, 1963; March and Simon, 1958), it had long been
acknowledged that decisions in organisations are taken by boundedly rational people. The bounds on people's rationality,
according to the Carnegie theorists, are brought about by the limited ability of individuals to process all information relevant for
taking decisions in complex environments. Therefore, in order to cope with complexity, managers process only part of the
relevant stimuli and filter information according to their own cognitive base. This base is composed of assumptions about future
events, knowledge of alternatives and the consequences of alternatives (March and Simon, 1958). A person's cognitive base is
formed by individual life experiences, including formal training and work history. Therefore, it is argued that a manager's
specific perception of and response to environmental stimuli will partly depend upon the experiences (s)he has had during
her/his life - that is, on her/his personal demography. The Carnegie School thus largely demystified the manager as a rational
actor in the traditional sense of an objective optimizer but instead linked the decision maker's individual constitution to the
choices (s)he makes. The connection between managerial choices and outcomes was made in the early 70s, when strategic
choice theorists (Child, 1972; 1974) developed and successfully tested the idea that company performance is not completely
externally determined by market influences. Rather, managerial choices and strategies can play an important role in explaining
performance differences between organisations in comparable contexts.
3The important contribution of Hambrick and Mason (1984) was to point at the potency of - and to stimulate systematic
empirical research into - demographic variables like age, gender, and functional, educational and socio-economic backgrounds
of the executive team in directly explaining a variety of organisational outcomes. Specifically, they provided an agenda to
research the effects of these top management characteristics on organisational attributes such as types of strategies, extent and
type of diversification, innovativeness and ultimately growth and variability in profit. Moreover, they underlined the relevance
of existing social-psychological research into group heterogeneity or diversity for the study of top management teams. In this
way, they linked the research tradition of group dynamics with that of strategic choice in the context of a specific type of groups:
top management teams. This viewing of organisational strategic choices and performance levels as determined by managerial
background characteristics was coined the upper echelons perspective. 
In Hambrick and Mason's model (1984), shown in figure 1 below, two classes of managerial characteristics are
distinguished: one observable, including personal and group demographic variables, and one psychological, including the
individual's cognitive base and values. Combined, they influence the strategic choices TMTs make. 
--------------------------------------------------------------
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These choices range from acquisition and product innovation decisions to issues of administrative structure and hierarchical
authority. In turn, these choices produce organisational performance in terms of profit (variability), growth and survival.
Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that the TMT's influence on performance might come in two ways: direct and indirect. Two
hypothetical examples will illustrate these effects. As for the direct effect, longer tenured teams may have so much industry
experience that their response time to an arising strategic problem is condensed compared to that of a shorter tenured team
which needs prolonged time to process information and sort things out. Therefore, although their ultimate strategic choice may
be the same, the quicker response of the experienced team may contribute more to organisational performance than the relatively
inexperienced team's lagged reaction. Note that with these direct effects it is not the particular choice but aspects of team
processing and functioning that influence performance. Indirect effects arise when different team characteristics lead to different
strategic hoices and, consequently, different outcomes. Teams composed largely of people with economic business training may
react  differently to increased foreign competition compared with a team of technocrats. The former may be inclined to counter
by cutting prices, whereas the latter may prefer to react by changing product designs to deliver higher perceived value. 
Another important aspect of Hambrick and Mason's model is that the objective external and internal situation is included as
well. Three reasons can be given for this. First, the objective situation co-determines which people rise to the top. Internal
political processes and external industry norms place restrictions on people's upward mobility in organisations (Pfeffer, 1983).
For example, technical industries, such as chemicals, tend to be dominated by managers holding technical degrees. Second, the
nature and structure of an industry have a direct impact on strategic choices regarding such issues as acquisition, capital intensity
and integration (Porter, 1980). Third, external and internal situational factors may impose important restrictions upon the
manoeuvring space of managers as to their strategic choices. Societal pressure groups, legislation, market evolution, powerful
boards of directors and/or company councils may severely limit the degrees of freedom upper echelons have in deciding on
critical matters. This manoeuvring space is gen rally referred to as managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkelstein, 1987). It is
an important interaction variable in the general model by determining whether the effects of TMT characteristics on
organisational outcomes will materialize. So, to sum up, in the upper echelons model psychological and observable
characterist cs of the TMT determine performance directly via team processes and indirectly via the strategic choices they lead
to. The objective situation, both internal and external, also bears a direct influence on the characteristics of the TMT and on the
strategic choices made. The team aspects that are of particular interest in TMT studies are discussed in the next paragraph.
 
2.2 TMT variables and the multiple effects of variety
4Upper echelons tudies employ a number of variables measuring aspects of the TMT that can be classified under two headings.
First, we can look at the average or lev l f specific attributes of the team members, an example being average tenure. We may
then theorize on how teams with different average tenures may differ in their behaviour and performance. These team-level
hypothes then, are merely xtrapolations of what is expected and/or known at the individual level. For instance, as long-
tenured employees tend to develop rigid behavioural patterns and frames of reference, the same is expected of teams with long
average tenure (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). Second, we can focus on the spr ad or distribution of specific team members'
attributes - for example in case we are interested in how age differences in teams affect processes and results of team
interactions. Teams, then, can be either homogeneous (low spread) or heterogeneous (high spread) with regard to such
characteristics. When it comes to the spread or variety of attributes (age, tenure, education) hypothesis generation is much more
complex than it was in case of the averages where extrapolation to the team level sufficed. This is so because in case of variety,
groups encounter specific problems in dealing with their inequality per se, that is, independent of the specific attribute on which
they differ. For this reason we will have a more in depth look at the effect homogeneity or heterogeneity of teams has on their
functioning and performance. Two theoretical perspectives on this issue can be distinguished. The first will be labelled the
process facilitation perspective, which underscores the importance of homogeneity; the second is the resource diversity
perspective, advocating heterogeneity. Both perspectives are discernable and recurrent throughout all hypothesizing on variety
effects in the upper echelons studies we will encounter in the empirical section. We will treat the effects subsequently below.
The process facilitation view
Homogeneity at the group level means that group members are alike with regard to important attitudes and values. This
similarity may be caused by the members being of roughly the same cohorts (Pfeffer, 1983). This implies that members in
homogeneous groups share important dates (Ryder, 1965) and, consequently, life experiences. They were, for example, raised in
the same era, studied in comparable school systems, entered the labou  market under similar circumstances and have comparable
careers. Moreover, at any point in time they probably share similar life stage experiences such as marrying, raising children,
losing parents, et cetera. In fact, empirical studies in social psychology have demonstrated that people who are alike in attitud
and socio-economic status tend to be attracted more to each other and exchange a larger number of positive reinforcements
(Byrne, Clore & Worchel, 1966) than people who are different in these respects. When those relatively similar people form a
group, they are therefore expected to show greater social integration and cohesion because they share important frames of
reference, attitudes and values (McCain, O'Reilly and Pfeffer, 1983; Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly, 1984). In effect, a positive
association between homogeneity and cohesion was shown in several group studies including top management teams (Katz,
1982; O'Reilly, Caldwell and Barnett, 1989). Similar frames of reference among team members facilitate communication
frequency and effectiveness (Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly, 1984; Zenger and Lawrence, 1989), which is, in turn, thought to
produce superior team social integration and, ultimately, organisational performance (Smith et al., 1994).
There is, however, a dark side to homogeneity. It was already noted that homogeneity generally enhances cohesion and
social integration. Moreover, cohesive groups reveal greater conformity (Lott and Lott, 1961). This may imply that social
acceptability is maintained at the cost of lower criticism towards other group members and their contributions and also a
decreased ability to critically evaluate (strategic) alternatives and environmental developments. The group becomes less open to
absorbing information (Whitney & Smith, 1983) and discussing novel behavioural patterns. This set of group pathologies is well
documented under the name of groupthink (Janis, 1972), involving a general decrease in mental efficiency by which the desire
for consensus and group unity in cohesive groups overrides the realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. In their fear of
'rocking the boat', victims of groupthink tend to conform to the co munis opinio within the group even if privately they have
serious doubts about its correctness. This may lead to escalating commitment to existing choices and strategies (Brockner, 1992),
especially when these were successful in the past (Hambrick, Geletkanycz and Frederickson, 1993).
5The resource diversity view
If a group faces a complex decision environment, team performance may benefit from having a wide range of viewpoints that
can be discussed and evaluated critically. In order to cope with the multi-faceted issues that arise in a complex environment,
solutions must be ingenious. Team heterogeneity is likely to facilitate the 'production' of such a wide spectrum of perspectives.
As people are the carriers of cognitive capacities and as there are limits to the cognitive complexity an individual can handle
(Cyert and March, 1963), every team member can provide only part of the diversity needed to solve the problem. The cognitive
resources must therefore be pooled to solve complex dilemmas: teams should be diverse to accomplish this. Empirical researc
indeed reveals that in solving complex and non-routine problems groups are more effective when composed of members with a
variety of skills, knowledge, abilities and perspectives (Filley, House and Kerr, 1976; Shaw, 1976; Wanous and Youtz, 1986).
Especially innovation seems to be enhanced by heterogeneity of team members (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Katz, 1982; Murray,
1989). Diversity with regard to psychological types is also advocated (Belbin, 1981; Blaylock, 1983; Hurst, Rush and White,
1989).
Nonetheless, heterogeneity has important drawbacks in relation to group processes. As team members have diverging frames
of reference, attitudes and values, communication is hampered (McCain, O'Reilly and Pfeffer, 1983; Zenger and Lawrence,
1989). This, in turn, enhances the chances of conflicts, turnover (Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly, 1984) and power struggles to
occur (Pfeffer, 1983), attracting attention away from the immediate tasks of the group. According to group dynamics theorists,
there is a tradeoff between group-maintenance and task-oriented behaviour (Shaw, 1976). This means that the operational
efficiency of the heterogeneous team in performing its tasks is threatened because much time and energy are required to
overcome communication barriers and power games. 
 
A balance
Relative homogeneity and heterogeneity endow the team with different strengths and weaknesses. On the positive side,
homogeneity lowers communication barriers and eases member interactions, whereas heterogeneity provides creativity and
innovativeness in problem solving. On the negative side, homogeneity can lead to apathy, non-responsiveness and a lack of
critical spirit, while heterogeneity hinders effective communication and wastes resources (especially time) in power struggles.
However, organisations and teams operate in different environments in which the pros and cons of team composition may have a
diverging impact on organisational functioning and effectiveness. An important moderator is environmental turbulence. High
turbulence in the organisation's environment requires the organisation to be creative in adapting to changing environmental
demands. This would call for a heterogeneous team regarding functional speciality, educational background and/or personality.
Conversely, a stable environment may require the task-orientedness of a homogeneous team. In addition, low turbulence
decreases the necessity to be creative and innovative. So, under specific environmental contingencies different team
compositions may be warranted to arrive at a bal nce between homo- and heterogeneity effects that facilitate team performance
most. A review of three decades of literature concerning the effects of diversity in different environments (Maznevski, 1994)
suggests, that member diversity will only realize its potential and improve performance if members can understand each other
and combine and build on each others' ideas, that is: if in egrat on is achieved among the diverse members. For instance, a study
by Abrahamson (1992) revealed that the companies most successful in entering a new market were those headed by TMTs hig
on both diversity and integration.      
2.3 The model refined
Now that we have assessed the importance of the above processes in determining outcomes in teams, we are ready to incorporate
them more formally in our own stylized model. See figure 2. 
-----------------------------------------------------------
6INSERT 2 ABOUT HERE
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The direct path of Hambrick and Mason has now been replaced by the influence of team composition on the processes within the
team. In accordance with the two perspectives above, team composition can have an affective effect (social integration) and a
cognitive effect (breadth of perspective and creativity). Both effects will influence performance. For instance, poor
communication in heterogeneous groups may delay decision making so as to miss opportunities; groups dominated by seniors
may take more conservative strategic choices than juniors-dominated teams. From the present model, it should already be
evident hat many variables interact in determining the ultimate impact of group composition on performance. In the next section
we will present the evidence on this matter.
3. Empirical TMT composition research
In the present section we will summarize the empirical research on TMT composition within the upper echelons framework.
Thus, although we rely on a broader tradition of group (diversity) research to form our expectations, we will confront these with
existing empirical findings in TMT settings. This means that in this review we will not deal with aspects of organisational
diversity that, to our knowledge, have not yet been studied at the level of TMTs, like for instance race or ethnic background,
nationality, gender and personality (see also Milliken and Martins, 1996). Instead we will report on the effects of compositional
variables like age, tenure and functional experience that have attracted most attention so far. These compositional variables all
touch in some way or the other on the amount (average) and diversity (heterogeneity) of experience the TMT contains by way of
its members. Experiences can be diverse in nature. They may be life experiences (as in chronological age), team experiences (as
in TMT tenure), organisational experiences (as in organisational tenure), industry experiences (as in industry tenure), functional
experiences (as in member's functional backgrounds) and educational experiences (as in professional/ educational background). 
In the next two sections we will ask ourselves what effects may be expected of the average amounts (3.1) and variety (3.2)
of experiences in TMTs and what the empirical evidence looks like. Section 3.3 summarizes the results.
 
3.1 Average experiences
Intuitively, high average experience in a team  will improve its performance. This would be a simple human capital way of
looking at it: the more experience people have in a certain area, the better they will be able to interpret their situation and th
more effective they will be in dealing with the problems they confront. However, this way of reasoning tends to hold overly
optimistic assumptions about people's memories and flexibility in interpreting and applying knowledge. In fact, experience tends
to form frames of reference that may lead to habitual routines in interpreting and acting upon problems (Pfeffer, 1983;
Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). If so, teams highly experienced in certain areas may have difficulty in handling the new and
unexpected that occupy no place (yet) in the industrial, organisational or functional paradigm on which they act. In fact, they
may not even notice it. Thus, high experience can both enhance and hinder performance partly depending on the flexibility
needed.
Average age
7      As a matter of convenience, a rather sharp distinction is made here between "old" and1
"young" teams as measured by their average chronological age. As with all "average effects"
theory is largely an extrapolation of what is known at the individual level. Therefore, in
describing the "pure" effects of high versus low age in teams, we have to implicitly assume
spread to be low. This is a frequent but seldom acknowledged assumption in most studies.
2 Of course, the entrepreneurial type of diversification is meant here, as the kind of
diversification inspired by portfolio considerations is intended only to reduce risk.
Team members' average age is likely to affect the functioning of teams for a number of reasons. First, when comparing teams of
high versus low average age it is important to note that young teams were raised and educated in another epoch than ld teams.1
Depending on the specific socio-economic situations that prevailed during their way to the top they will probably hold different
values, outlooks and practices concerning their work. Thus, their behaviour and results are likely to reflect their age. Assessing
the impact of these differing views on team results is however very difficult. To the present author's knowledge no empirical
study has yet been undertaken to see what age-related viewpoint differences between teams affect strategies and performance.
Second, ageing seems to have a detrimental effect on cognitive faculties like learning ability, reasoning and memory (Botwinick,
1977; Burke and Light, 1981). This may generally have a negative bearing on executives' functioning as they get older. Third,
younger managers were empirically found to have more favourable attitudes towards risk taking (Vroom and Pahl, 1971).
Moreover, managerial youth is thought to be associated with much risky experimenting due to relative lack of experience. Thus,
higher risk taking among younger managers, is a combined result of their risk taking attitude and the way they necessarily go
about in learning the rules of the game. Older teams then, are thought to be characterized by a certain conservatism which,
according to Hambrick and Mason (1984) is due to physical and mental limitations (Child, 1974), greater psychological
commitment to the status quo (Stevens, Beyer & Trice, 1978) or financial and career security considerations (Carlsson &
Karlsson, 1970).   
These theoretical and empirical results have prompted researchers to hypothesize mainly on two i sues in relation t the average
age of team members (Hambrick and Mason, 1984). First, youth was expected to lead to th  pursuit of risky strategies involving
innovation and diversification. This hypothesis was already backed by evidence mentioned above on younger managers' riskier2
attitude. Second, as innovation and diversification strategies, when successful, will lead to expansion, companies experiencing
above industry average rates of growth and profit variability are more likely to be led by teams that have relatively low average
ages. Previous research does indeed suggest managerial youth to be associated with corporate growth (Child, 1974; Hart and
Mellons, 1970), although the direction of causality in these models remains unclear.     
Few recent empirical studies into the effects of average TMT member age exist. The research by Wiersema and Bantel
(1992) (see Appendix) lends support to the hypothesis that older teams lead companies experiencing less strategic change.
However, in Bantel and Jackson's (1989) study the hypothesized direct association between average TMT age and
innovativeness did not materialize. Instead, a negative spurious correlation existed: bigger companies both employed relatively
young management teams and were more innovative. Generally, then, it appears that older teams are more hesitant in taking
diversification risks, but not in taking innovation risks. A possible explanation may be that diversification is perceived
strategically riskier because it leads the organisation further from its established safe core domains than does innovation. 
Average tenure on the team
The influence on performance of the time a certain (relatively) fixed group of people has worked together, is usually measured
by taking the members' average team tenure. As people work together for a longer period of time, several related social
8      In quoting empirical TMT research into this relationship, authors (e.g. Smith et al., 1994)3
sometimes erroneously refer to studies that do not as a matter of fact deal with team tenure, but
rather with the average organizational tenure of members within the team. In our empirical
overview (see Appendix) we only mentioned studies that explicitly dealt with the average
tenure of members on the team.
processes begin to affect group behaviour and especially communication. Katz (1982) suspected these tendencies in
communication to play an important mediating role in the typical curvilinear relationship between average team tenure and
project group performance that was found in previous research (Pelz & Andrews, 1966; Smith, 1979): at first average team
tenure seems to enhance team performance, but after a certain (optimal) point, it depresses performance. Four processes are
thought o occur as teams work together for a longer time.  First, as groups start to structure their work, they will eventually
develop standard work patterns or routines (Weick, 1979), that are predictable and comfortable to them. Groups will thus
exhibit increasing behavioural stability over time. Moreover, with increasing group longevity, group members will tend to
increasingly close off towards information that threatens to disrupt their comfortable and predictable practices and patterns of
behaviour (Staw, 1977). Second, long-standing membership leads to a phenomenon called selective exposure (Rogers and
Shoemaker, 1971). This is a tendency for group members to communicate only with those whose ideas and viewpoints are in
accord with their own interests and current perspectives. Outside messages and information conflicting with their established
practices and dispositions are more likely to be avoided. Third, a relatively long history of shared experiences and socialization
is likely to bind the group together by providing similar frames of references. Therefore, as team members continue to interact
over time, the set of understandings about the group and its environment will become more homogeneous (Salancik and Pf ff r,
1978). Burke and Bennis (1961) showed, that consensus with one another increased among team members interacting over a
longer period of time. All this has a positive influence on the group's sense of identity, but it will also demarcate the group more
sharply from other groups in the organisation. Consequently, the quantity and quality of inter group communication is likely to
decrease with team longevity. Fourth, as team members work together for a long time the tasks they have to perform, are likely
to be accomplished using a division of labour or role differentiation that is increasingly well tuned to members' individual
strengths and weaknesses. Each member knows what to expect from others, and what is expected of him. This lowers the
immediate necessity of task-related talk and interaction among team members (Porter, Lawler and Hackman, 1975). Taken
together, over time interactions among team members and with members of other teams, are expected to decrease. In an
important study among 50 R&D project groups, Katz (1982) tested the above predictions concerning the effect of group
longevity on communication and performance. He found empirical support for the increased "closing off" of longer tenured
teams from key information sources both within and outside their groups. Communication appeared to be significantly less in
high-tenured teams as opposed to short-tenured teams. In fact, with regard to contacts outside the project group, a curvilinear
association was detected, indicating an initial increase and subsequent decrease in outside communications with increasing team
tenure. More importantly, Katz did find these communication patterns to mediate the relationship between team age and team
performance. Specifically, performance was curvilinearly related to team age because communication rose and fell with
increasing team tenure. In explaining the form of this relationship, it is argued that in low tenure regions team building and
learning promote performance as team members contribute fresh ideas and get to know each other's strengths better. After a
certain amount of time however (about 2,5 years in Katz' study) high longevity teams te d to "settle down", rely on routines and
decrease overall communication. As a result performance deteriorates. That is: his study demonstrates "the important role group
longevity and its underlying social processes can play in influencing the information processing behaviours of project group
members which, in turn, affect project performance" (Katz, 1982; p.98).
From the empirical overview (see Appendix), it is clear that few researchers had a close look at TMT longevity as an3
influencing variable on performance. The positive effect team tenure has on strategic change, was not expected by Wiersema and
9Bantel (1992). Instead, they drew on Katz (1982) in hypothesizing lower communication levels and consequently higher
resistance to change in longer tenured teams. Possibly, they speculate, team longevity fosters social integration and more
effective communication which in turn promotes performance. The positive effect on group dynamics and change seems to taper
off, however, at higher levels of team tenure, indicating that, over time, teams in frequent interaction develop towards the
"optimal" smooth group dynamics that ease strategic change. Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) discovered a strong positive
effect of the joint prior work experience of founders on the success of new ventures. Again referral is made to heightened
familiarity, cohesiveness and communication quality among groups having experience in working together. Finally, Smith et.
all.(1994) did not find any of the expected effects of team age.
On balance, then, results on TMTs are not very clear. Two studies do find a positive effect of average team tenure whil
another does not. However, these results may very well hide the curvilinear relationship established so often in other group
research. Regrettably, this relationship is not explicitly tested in any of the TMT studies. Moreover, authors are often unclear
about the units of measurement and ranges of their average measures, making it difficult to compare results of studies. Still, this
drawback seems characteristic of TMT research in general. 
Average tenure in the organisation
Long organisational tenures may be seen as the outcome of a self-selection process by which those adhering to the organisations'
norms and perspectives are willing or allowed to stay in the firm (Pfeffer, 1983). Longer tenured managers are therefore mor
committed to the organisations' ways (Wanous, 1980), show higher commitment to the status quo (Stevens et al., 1978; Staw and
Ross, 1980) and to the values of the firm (Schmidt & Posner, 1983). With organisational tenure, managers' rigidity and
commitment to established policies and practices increases (Katz, 1982; Hambrick et al., 1993) as an action repertoire is built
up over time that promotes behavioural stability (Finkelstein and Hambrick, 1990). Ever more reliance is put on experience
instead of on new stimuli (Katz, 1982) and resistance to change and risk-aversion may become politically or emotionally
motivated because of vested interests (Salancik, 1977; Miller and Friesen, 1980). Generally, then, some kind of conservatism i
strategies and policies is expected. Empirical team results (see Appendix) demonstrate this conservatism of long tenured TMTs
in three studies. Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) found that higher average organisational tenures led firms to be more
persistent and inflexible in their strategies. Moreover, these firms appeared to follow "middle of the road" strategies closely
resembling those of competitors, resulting in performance levels close to industry averages. Similarly, Wiersema and Bantel
(1992) find the amount of corporate strategic change to be related to low average organisational tenure. This apparent
conservatism, however, does not necessarily lead to lower levels of innovation (Bantel and Jackson, 1989) or lower
performance. To the contrary, perhaps, as Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) show in a matched sample of surviving and failing
firms. Bankrupts' TMTs appeared to have lower and declining average organisational tenures in the years preceding their failure
than their surviving counterparts, reflecting the higher turnover rate in this period. However, bankrupts' organisational tenures
were already significantly lower five years before failure and it is doubtful whether this signals lower managing qualities of short
tenured teams. More probably, it simply reflects the turmoil (scapegoating, replacements or voluntary departures) that are a
well-known tendency in troubled organizations (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992). Michel and Hambrick (1992) find a tendency
for longer tenured TMTs to lead companies with a high degree of interdependence in business unit diversification. This result
was expected as the integration, coordination and (especially) communication skills needed to manage interdependencies across
business units would be fostered by more cohesive groups, allegedly TMTs with high organisational tenures. However, nor TMT
organisational tenure, nor its interaction with the degree of interdependence appeared to affect performance. So we can
conclude that high organisational tenure TMTs tend to be rather conservative with regard to strategic choice and flexibility,
leading to quite average results. 
10
Average tenure in the industry
Just like high organisational tenure, long tenures in a certain industry built shared interpretations and policy preferences that
form a kind of 'industry wisdom'. Several studies  have shown the existence of these kinds of 'industry recipes'  to managing a
company within the industry (Spender, 1989; Hambrick et al., 1993). As their industry tenure rises, managers show an
increasing psychological adherence to these industry specific frames of reference. Therefore, they take on an increasingly
prominent position in managers' views on current problems. Despite the potential value of this in-depth industry familiarity
(Gupta, 1984), too much industry experience may, just like organisational experience, restrict managers' awareness of
alternatives and lead to 'conservative' policies close to industry standards. This point was clearly demonstrated in a study by
Hambrick et al. (1993) who  did indeed find a strong association between industry tenure and top executives' commitment to the
status quo concerning their organisations' future policies and leadership. Interestingly, the effect of industry tenure on
commitment to the status quo appeared stronger than and independent of that of organisational tenure, suggesting a distinctive
impact of industry experiences on conservatism. Unfortunately, the authors only report a small and insignificant positive simple
correlation betwen CEO industry tenure and performance. Their call for team level research in this area has not yet been
followed; consequently there is no empirical material to report on. Based on the foregoing, it does however make sense to
expect average industry tenure to have similar effects as organisational tenure.
 
Average educational level
An individual's level of education reflects its cognitive abilities and skills. As such, it was shown to be positively associated with
tolerance for ambiguity and information processing capacity (Schroder, Driver and Streufert, 1967; Dollinger, 1984). Because
of this, higher educated people may be expected to "generate (and implement) creative solutions to complex problems" (Bantel
and Jackson, 1989: 110) and indeed higher managerial education level appears consistently associated with the receptivity to
innovation (Becker, 1970; Rogers and Shoemaker, 1971; Kimberly and Evanisko, 1981). These findings have inspired team
researchers as well (see Appendix). Bantel and Jackson (1989) found innovation to be greater in banks headed by more
educated TMTs. Similarly, the mean educational level of a team appeared to be the strongest demographic predictor of strategic
change in an het rogeneous sample of US manufacturing companies (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). It may be speculated fro
this, that higher average educational levels on a team make it more prone to undertake highly consequential strategic decisions
that help ensure survival in the long run. A (direct) connection between educational level and performance, however, was not
researched.
 
Main functional expertise
Although a categorical variable like functional experience cannot be averaged (just like, for instance, race or nationality), teams
can be rated according to the relative dominance of certain functional expertise represented in a team. Various studies in the
strategy literature have shown that different strategies may require different functional skills for successful implementation (Hitt,
Ireland and Palia, 1982; Snow and Hrebiniak, 1980). For instance, Gupta and Govindarajan (1984) reasoned that "build"
strategies, required a managerial competence at monitoring and analysing external industry characteristics like consumer needs
and competitor strategies; competencies that are relatively more typical of managers with functional experience in marketing
and sales. "Harvest" strategies on the other hand require skills to improve internal efficiency.   Thus, the hypothesis was
formulated that general managers with experience in marketing and sales would be more successful in implementing "build"
rather than "harvest" strategies. This was indeed the case; moreover, implementation of harvest strategies even appeared to b
hampered by managers' marketing or sales backgrounds. A match between managers' functional expertise and the required
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strategic expertise was also found by Song (1982) and Chaganti and Sambharya (1987). In the former study, CEOs of companies
diversifying through internal growth had mainly followed marketing and operations careers, whereas the CEOs of acquisitive
diversifiers tended to have finance, accounting and law backgrounds. Chaganti and Sambharya (1987) analysed the functional
make-up of the dominant coalitions of a prospector, analyser and defender in the US tobacco industry. As expected, the
dominant coalition of the prospector firm had a higher percentage of executives with R&D and marketing backgrounds than the
analyser and defender firm; the defender firm employed the highest percentage of finance-oriented executives. 
To date, only two studies into the effects of core functions represented in the TMT exist. Michel and Hambrick (1992)
expect eams managing more interdependent business units to need a higher proportion of top managers that understand the
substantive rather than the strictly financial or administrative implications of their decisions. This understanding, they expect, is
brought by core operational areas like marketing, operations and R&D. The results of their analysis upports the contention that
more interdependent businesses were led by teams with more core functional expertise. However, contrary to expectation, this
match produced worse instead of better results, something the authors have difficulty in explaining. Hambrick and d'Aveni
(1992) take a related point of departure. They stress the general importance of so-called 'core functional area's' like design,
production and marketing in the survival of firms. Experience in these area's, it is argued, ensures executives with "hands-on"
competencies that staff fields like accounting, finance, law and personnel do not provide (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980;
Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992). As compared to survivors, bankrupts did indeed have lower and declining levels of core
functional expertise in their teams as they approached failure. It appears, then, that given the specific tasks of a TMT team, a
matching amount of core expertise may prove critical in handling situations appropriately. 
3.2  Experience variety
As discussed in section 2.2, two opposing viewpoints exist as to the normative effects of team diversity. On the one hand
diversity offers more diverse resources to confront complex problems. On the other hand it wastes resources: dissimilar people
have more difficulty in working together because they lack common ground. An important moderator in determining the
performance impact of diversity is the state of the environment. In complex and changing circumstances, diversity may have a
premium, whereas in stable conditions homogeneity seems preferable. These main and moderated effects will be recurrent in the
empirical experience variety studies below.
 
Age variety.
People' outlook on the world is greatly determined by the historic events and societal values during their formative years
(Eisenstadt, 1956). People from similar age cohorts are therefore likely to share important frames of reference inherited from
their past, but present experiences in the present are also likely to be similar. For instance, employees of the same age share the
experience of important historical events (e.g. wars, crises, social developments), and are now probably raising children of the
same age or tend to have other similar events occurring in their family lives. Shared biographies produce a shared language,
including a common vocabulary and interpretation of events concerning a wide range of non-work-related issues (Ryder, 1965).
Because of these language compatibilities, people who share demographic attributes (in this case age) communicate more
frequently (Byrne, 1969; Pfeffer, 1983; Zenger & Lawrence, 1989). They feel attracted to each other more and form more
cohesive groups (Lott and Lott, 1965; Good and Nelson, 1971) which will generally lead to enhanced team performance (Shaw,
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      This will only hold if the group's norms are set to high perf rmance; otherwise even the4
opposite may occur (Shaw, 1981) 
      Surprisingly, individual distance in age to other team members lowered individual5
turnover, that is: more distant members were less likely to turn over. This finding remains ill
understood.
1981; Mullen and Copper, 1994; Smith et al., 1994). Teams of dissimilar age lack these integrating forces and are likely to run4
into communication problems that may result in power struggles, conflict (Pfeffer, 1983) and, ultimately, turnover. O'Reilly et.
all (1989) even report a direct positive effect of group age heterogeneity on turnover: the relationship was not mediated by
worsened social integration. 5
In empirical TMT research (see Appendix), two studies were concerned with these turnover effects. Wagner et. all. (1984)
find a negative influence of individual age distances on the likelihood of individuals to stay in the team, a result that is in line
with theory in that age similarity fosters interpersonal attraction and thus the likelihood of staying.  The stimulating effect of
TMT age heterogeneity on turnover was particularly strong in a sample of Japanese TMTs (Wiersema and Bird; 1993) allegedly
because of Japanese' higher (cultural) sensitivity to interpersonal differences. Interestingly, in the TMT literature, ag
heterogeneity is also expected to provide the variety of perspectives that may enhance innovation and strategic change.
However, neither of the two studies on this issue (Bantel and Jackson, 1989; Wiersema and Bantel, 1992) could detect these
expected effects. 
We conclude that ge heterogeneity promotes turnover both at the individual and at the team level. A positive effect on
strategic change and innovation was not found. No study directly examined the effect on organisational performance. However,
as TMT turnover tends to precede (and follow) bad organisational performance (Hambrick and D'Aveni, 1992), it may be
speculated that age heterogeneity is ultimately associated with low performance through its effect on turnover.
Team tenure variety
Homogeneity of tenures on the team suggests a shared socialization and group experiences that reinforce cohort effects
(Wiersema nd Bantel, 1992) including heightened cohesiveness and lower turnover. O'Reilly et al.(1989), for instance, show
that team tenure homogeneity of work groups increases group level social integration, which in turn, restricts turnover in the
team. 
TMT studies (see Appendix) were mostly concerned with these positive effects of team tenure diversity on turnover.
Although the effect did not materialize in a US context study (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993) a study among Japanese TMTs
(Wiersema nd Bird, 1993) did show a strong positive impact of team tenure diversity on team turnover. According to Wiersema
and Bird (1993) this is caused by a greater attention and sensitivity to differences among Japanese TMTs because they are
substantially more homogeneous than US TMTs. What is more, Japanese' collectivist cultural values are likely to encourage
conformity and heighten sensitivity to own and others' differences. Only Wiersema and Bantel (1992) formulated and tested an
alternative xpectation favouring heterogeneity of team tenures. They hypothesized that team tenure homogeneity leads firms to
undertake l ss corporate strategic change, as it provides a group with less variety of information sources and outlooks to act
upon. However, no support for this hypothesis was found. We can conclude that team tenure homogeneity tends to increase
social integration and lower member turnover. Variety of team tenures does not seem to enhance strategic change.
 
Organisational tenure variety
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      In fact, Smith et al. (1994) used a composite measure of industry and organizational6
tenure heterogeneity (alpha =.62), called experience heterogeneity.          
Just like people of the same age cohort share life experiences, people of the same organisational cohort share many
organisational experiences that over time lead to the development of similar beliefs and perspectives on the firm and how it
operates (Pfefer, 1983; Tushman and Romanelli, 1985; Wagner et al., 1984) This set of perspectives can be thought of as an
organisational paradigm that is more congruent within groups of similar dates of entry. This congruence among organisational
members on a team enhances interpersonal communication (Zenger and Lawrence, 1989) and cohesion (Lott and Lott, 1961;
Katz, 1982). However, too much homogeneity may ultimately lead to groupthink (Janis, 1972): an urge to maintain good
intragroup relations at the cost of realistic and critical appraisal of alternatives. This critical spirit is more likely to be
maintained in a somewhat heterogeneous team, pooling long and short tenured people to provide more diverse opinions.
Moreover, members who joined the organisation at different times often have different technical skills and views on the
organisation. The diverse pool of these inputs may in fact improve the probability that a group will generate diverse and
innovative solutions (Ancona and Caldwell, 1992) that lead to higher quality decisions (Wanous and Youtz, 1986). Thus,
organisational tenure diversity is likely to influence group processes and outcomes in different ways.
In fact, this compositional variable is among the most popular ones studied in empirical TMT research (see Appendix).
Michel and Hambrick (1992) expect homogeneous TMTs to head firms having strongly interdependent business unit
diversification postures. Homogeneity of tenures is thought to promote cohesion and high quality of in-group communicatio
that are in turn deemed necessary to manage interdependencies. In contrast to this hypothesis, they find that organisational tenure
heterogeneity is associated with high interdependence. This unexpected result is very attributed to a higher need for team
continuation in high interdependence firms. This would be facilitated by staggered team membership around a high team tenure
mean. In their own words, this would "[e]nhance stability and provide opportunities for the mentoring and grooming of heirs.
The team recreates itself slowly, gradually engendering commitment to a core business, shared perspectives and perpetuation of
a given strategy" (Michel and Hambrick, 1992: 30). We feel this is a rather far-fetched explanation where a much simpler
alternative xists: managing high interdependence calls for the more varied repertoire of experiences in a heterogeneously
tenured team. Anyway, the direct relationships with performance of firms, nor the interactions between interdependency and
heterogeneity were significant. 
As to the expected higher turnover among teams with heterogeneous organisational tenures, two studies are of interest.
Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly (1984) do indeed find the expected result in a US sample of TMTs. However, in the Japanese
firms study by Wiersema and Bird (1993) organisational tenure heterogeneity is in fact the only temporal heterogeneity measure
that does not have a (direct) effect on team turnover. The lack of significance for organizational tenure heterogeneity was caused
probably by its association with a control variable, mean team age, which had a strong negative impact on turnover in Japanese
firms. The latter is counter intuitive from a Western point of view and possibly reflects good job switching opportunities for
young Japanese employees and/or a reluctance of incumbent dominant coalitions to share power by promoting young managers. 
The idea that diverse tenures may promote creativity is reflected in two studies searching for a link with innovation (Bantel
and Jackson, 1989) or strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992). However, neither study found heterogeneous
organisational tenures to predict more innovation or corporate strategic change, possibly because organisational tenur
heterogeneity does not adequately capture the underlying construct of creativity and information diversity. Finally, three studies
linked organisation tenure heterogeneity to corporate performance. Hambrick and d'Aveni (1992) found no difference in
organisational tenure heterogeneity between survivors and bankrupts in the five years preceding failure, suggesting that this kind
of heterogeneity is not associated with organisational decline nor with its successful management. Smith et al. (1994) did find a
negative direct effect of TMT experience heterogeneity, on the return of investment of high-technology firms, possibly6
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      In this study, organizational tenure heterogeneity is included only as a control variable7
"[t]o control for team effects and to ensure that the power distribution and team size variables
were not confounded" (Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1993: 854). As to its effect on performance
no expectation is stated.
indicating distracting and time-consuming conflict in these teams. New support was also found for the negative relationship
between tenure heterogeneity and the amount of informal communication within the team. The third study, by Haleblian and
Finkelstein (1993) again revealed a negative association between organisational tenure heterogeneity and a composite measure7
of firm performance. As can be expected, the relationship was most pronounced in the high discretion (computer) industry.
To summarize the above, heterogeneity of organisational tenures affects the team process mainly through more difficult
communication, integration and (at least in Western countries) increased turnover. As to the eventual organisational outcomes,
however, evidence is mixed. The influence this type of TMT variety on performance is at best neutral: it ranges from zero in
case of survival chances to negative in case of financial economic measures. In addition, no association between organisational
tenure heterogeneity and strategic decisions like change and innovation seem to exist.
Industrial tenure variety      
As discussed in the section on average industry tenure effects, experiences within an industry also tend to mould one's views on
how (all) companies within it should be managed; consequently industrial paradigms may develop. As with the other variety
effects, heterogeneity of industry tenures and experiences may lead to different interpretations and conflict whereas homogeneity
fosters interpersonal understanding and cohesion. Industries in a rut, may however benefit from frame-breaking insights typically
developed by more heterogeneous teams within the industry. However, these kinds of hypotheses on industrial tenur
heterogeneity were never empirically tested in TMT settings.
Educational background variety
In contrast to the preceding variables, educational tracks measure cognition more directly because of a self-reinforcing choice
and training process. Educational choice’s person’s makes reflect their personalities, attitudes and cognitive styles (Holland,
1973; 1985). In turn, the chosen curriculum further shapes perspectives and outlooks in line with the professional profile it seeks
to produce. Thus, whereas in case of age or tenure we have to infer a lot as to what at itudes it produces, educational tracks and
their content are known and people graduating will be fairly homogeneous in the professional attitudes and outlooks they were
taught (which is a lot more difficult to say from life or organisational experiences). A TMT with diverse educational
backgrounds (e.g. arts, sciences, business, engineering etc.) may be expected to benefit from these varying perspectives taken by
its members, but it should again be mindful of the strains that the integration of various perspectives is likely to produce on the
group process (Pfeffer, 1983). However, in a TMT study by Wiersema and Bantel (1983) the expected negative effect of
educational diversity on turnover did not materialize (Wiersema and Bantel, 1993). Other empirical TMT research (see
Appendix) has generally been rather mixed. The expected positive influence of educational heterogeneity on dynamic strategic
choices was found for strategic change (Wiersema and Bantel, 1992), but not in case of innovativeness (Bantel and Jackson,
1989). As to performance, Smith et al. (1994) find a positive direct effect of the heterogeneity in TMT years of education on
both ROI and sales growth and (again) no relation with process variables (communication and integration). This result supports
the creativity argument that may be expected to be particularly influential in dynamic industries. However, note that Smith et al.
are actually measuring some kind of educational tenure heterogeneity, which does not necessarily imply a broad scope of
15
      Wiersema and Bantel even report a negative simple correlation between educational8
curriculum heterogeneity and their control variable firm performance. 
different educational tracks.  We should therefore treat this result cautiously and can only con lude that educational differences8
do not particularly hamper group processes and may have direct positive effects on performance and the propensity to strategic
change.  
Functional background variety
In a similar way as educational tracks, time spent in a particular department or function is likely to lead to the development of a
viewpoint consistent with the activities and goals of that department or particular function. As a result, the usual problems and
benefits of diversity would arise in varyingly composed groups. Empirical evidence on the effects hereof on performance,
however, is mixed. Ancona and Caldwell (1992) found functionally diverse new product teams to perform worse, possibly
because of social integration or communication difficulties that relate to function-specific frames of reference. To test their
existence, Dearborn and Simon (1958) presented managers with a complex business case and found that "[e]ach executive will
perceive those aspects of a situation that relate specifically to the activities and goals of his department" (op. cit.: 142) So
selective perception in the identification of company problems arises. However, in an extended conceptual replication of
Dearborn and Simon's study by Walsh (1988) the former's results are severely doubted as managers do n t appear to suffer from
'impoverished world views or parochial information use' (op. cit.: 887) that reflect their functional area of management. Instead,
the average manager appeared very capable to identify problems and use information across five functional domains. Based on
these results then, we would not expect functional TMT homogeneity to lead to one-sided team views on problems. Nor would
heterogenous functional teams have substantial problems in integrating, communicating and performing, as Ancona and
Caldwell (1992) suggested. In short, we would not expect any particular effect from functional diversity. Nevertheless,
empirical TMT studies (see Appendix) keep basing their hypotheses on presumed integration difficulties, although without much
success. Smith et al. (1994) find no effect at all of functional TMT diversity on team processes or firm performance. A marginal
negative effect is found by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) but only in those  contexts where managerial discretion is high.
Michel and Hambrick (1992) also found no effect of functional diversity on the performance of diversified firms.   
Summarizing this TMT research then, we conclude that functional diversity does not influence performance much.
Temporal and background variety
One empirical study by Murray (1989: see Appendix) is discussed separately as it combines several spread variables in two
heterogeneity indexes, called temporal heterogeneity (age, team and organisational tenure) and background heterogeneity
(functional and educational experience). As hypothesized, temporal heterogeneity is positively related to (adaptability-based)
long-run performance, but no significantly negative association was found with (efficiency-based) short-run performance.
Apparently, short-run performance is very hard to predict from demographic data. This may be supportive of previous findings
(Weiner and Mahoney, 1981) that management contributions to short-run performance tend to be dominated by external
circumstances. Moreover, the effects only materialize in the oil business and not in the food business sub sample, probably
because success criteria in the latter are more determined by the marketing department than by the TMT. Contrary to temporal
heterogeneity, background heterogeneity was no significant predictor of either long or short-run performance.
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3.3 Summary of average and variety effects
Averages and spreads of various demographic variables in teams have been used to predict several organisational phenomena
ranging from turnover in the team itself to innovation, strategic change and performance. However, the results are far from
consistent and very often fail to reach significance. Table 1 summarizes the number of studies and hypotheses regarding the
demographic variables encountered, the  percentages confirmed effects, no effects and counter hypothesized effects.
_______________________________________
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE
_______________________________________
As can be seen, the record is not very impressive as results are ridden with non-findi gs and even counter hypothesized findings.
Average xperience appears most promising in the area of organizational, educational and functional experience. In particular,
low organizational experience and high education levels tend to be associated with organizational change and innovativeness,
whereas core functional expertise seems to be of general importance. Average age and team tenure are generally weak
predictors of organizational phenomena. 
In the realm of variety effects, the record is even worse. Findings are inconsistent (for instance regarding the effect on team
turnover) and difficult to relate to each other. Even for the most frequently studied organizational tenure variety variable, only 4
out of 13 hypothesized relationships could be confirmed. Overall, it is fair to conclude that although many serious attempts have
been undertaken to relate team demography to team outcomes and individual studies are sometimes successful in finding one or
two significant relationships, the results lack coherence between and often even within studies. In the next sec ion we will try to
explain what features of research thus far may be responsible for this bad record and we set forth possible remedies and
extensions in future research.         
4 Discussion
The present section will discuss the empirical TMT research to date in relation to the upper echelons model of figure 2. In doing
so, several limitations of current research will be identified along with possible extensions. First we will deal with the
theoretical foundation of the TMT studies. Second, a number of empirical issues will be raised.
 
4.1 Theory (development)
From the perspective of the upper echelons model as a whole, the first thing that clearly characterizes empirical research to date
is fragmentation. Different authors tend to deal with different parts of the upper echelons model, linking averages and spreads of
TMT characteristics to various strategic choices, processes and performance measures. The result, as stated above, is a rather
confusing set of (mostly unique) TMT research findings in various parts of the model, that are difficult to integrate in one clear
and coherent picture. 
A second, related point is the length of the causal chain explored. The upper echelons model clearly specifies a three- step
chain from team characteristics, through choices and/ or processes to performance. Most TMT research however only links
inputs to outputs based on an i ferred intermediate (choice) process that is not actually measured. Little is known consequently,
of how the effects are produced. In the studies reviewed here only the one by Smith et al. (1994) captures the entire causal chain
by including three process variables. The model thus formed explains 56 and 44 percent of total variance in ROI and sales
growth respectively. To the present author's knowledge, no empirical study yet exists that includes the whole model including
strategic choices.
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      This is important from a normative point of view. In screening candidates for an9
important acquisition function, should an applicant be interviewed and tested to gauge his
need for esteem or simply asked to state his father's income?
Third, in team studies competing theoretical expectations may exist as to the effect of certain variables (Hambrick and
D'Aveni, 1992) especially when it comes to the impact of team variety. Few authors (e.g. Murray, 1989; Finkelstein and
Hambrick, 1990) however handle this issue properly by either specifying alternative hypotheses, specifying curvilinear
relationships (e.g. Katz, 1982) or by including moderator variables to account for different effects under different circumstances.
Because of this, many non-findings remain unexplained that may in fact be due to imprecise specification of relationships or
circumstances under which effects should or should not materialize. For instance, variety on a team potentially provides many
perspectives on solving new problems with which the team has no experience yet. On the other hand, it hinders communication
and social integration as different people tend to hold different frames of reference and people generally prefer dealing with
likes. It now depends on the group’s task or the circumstances under which it is to perform its task, which of these effects will
take most prominent effect. In stable environments with routine problems, heterogeneity on a team is less warranted and its
destabilizing role on social functioning is likely to dominate and undermine performance. In more dynamic environments with
non-routine problems to be solved, heterogeneity may provide the needed breadth of perspective to arrive at an innovative
solution. Inter-individual differences are less damaging as they are interpreted and used productively to the task. In a similar
way, time pressure can prompt a team to acknowledge the need to set aside personal dislike and mistrust and turn heterogeneity
from a negative to a positive influence on team performance. Inclusion of interaction variables like for instance task
characteristics, environmental dynamism or time pressure does more justice to the situational specificity of demography effects
and may heighten the explained amount of variance in the dependent variables.        
A fourth important limitation of existing studies is their crude treatment of the individual choice process by using
demographic variables. In essence, people with certain demographic characteristics are supposed to be rather homogeneous in
holding certain attitudes, traits and values that assumingly lead to a particular behaviour. These attitudes and values are,
however, seldom measured and neither are their relationships with demographics. This obscures the exact mechanism by which
demographics influence behaviour, leading to rather speculative conclusions when expected results do not show up. We will
illustrate our point with an example by Hambrick and Mason (1984: 201). The authors quote research suggesting that manager
from lower socio-economic origins tend to pursue more diversification and acquisition. They do this "presumabl  in order to
achieve recognition and esteem" (op. cit., p. 201; emphasis added). However, when Hambrick and Mason translate this finding
to TMTs they stick to the simple association between background and diversification. Whether high needs for esteem do indeed
lead to diversification thus remains unclear. Similarly, whether managers' social class backgrounds are indeed related to need for
esteem in a particular sample remains unknown. Instead, a more distant (assumed) proxy of need for esteem (i.e. socio-9
economic background) is used. In addition, or even worse, the inferred behavioural implications of many demographic variables
can be very diverse, each having distinct and sometimes conflicting performance implications. For instance, higher average age
is often taken to represent more experience. It might, however, equally well signal conservatism or even physiological
(especially memory) deterioration that hinders performance and it has indeed been used in that sense. We suspect that many non-
findings in upper echelons studies are at least partly caused by this use of rather distal proxies (demographics). A research field
that is so fragmented and ridden with non-findings (52% in the reviewed literature) may therefor benefit from going one step
back in the causal chain by measuring managers' (pre)dispositions, for instance their personality, more directly and nking these
to their behaviours, choices and, ultimately, performance in a team. Thus, a focus on more fundamental behavioural tendencies
rooted in personality seems warranted because these are more directly linked to behaviour and provide a more vali
measurement of values and attitudes than do demographic variables. In fact, this is a crucial point that Hambrick and Mason
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(1983) readily acknowledged. When they presented the model and called for empirical research they made it very clear that
"[I]t is doubtful that this research stream can progress far without greater attention to relevant literature in related fields,
especially psychology and social psychology" (Hambrick and Mason, 1984: 203). Their emphasis on 'obs rvable' characteristics
to start with, was inspired by rather practical reasons like d ta availability and measurability. However, the growing need to use
more psychological variables in upper echelons research is repeatedly stressed by researchers in the field. For instance,
Hambrick et al. (1993: 402) state that "[E]ven though psychological factors (...) are of central significance to upper echelons
theory, such phenomena are rarely studied or measured directly in empirical inquiries of top executives". Indeed, we know of no
empirical upper echelons study to date that has explicitly looked at the psychological composition of the team. In fact this seems
to be a void even in the broader field of organizational diversity (Milliken and Martins, 1996).
A final limitation of the upper echelons model is its simplicity in dealing with the strategy concept itself. One aspect of this
problem was already mentioned above: the importance of interaction variables on the causal links in the model is too seldom
acknowledged. Moreover, the eagerness to predict specific strategic choices from demographics causes a complete lack of
attention to the importance of strategy making and implementation. That is: to the process of configuring repertoires of actions,
to the consistency of strategies both internally and over time and to the proper implementation of these strategies. Finally, th
dynamic processes of strategic adjustments and reactions over time have been completely overlooked. In many industries the
capacity to change or stick to  a strategic course is vital, so a proper m del that links choices to performance should include this
element as well.
4.2 Empirical issues
Three limitations of empirical nature will be discussed. First, there is a problem in untangling the different effects of the average
and variety of variables. Two teams that have the same spread (variety) in age, fo  instance, may have widely differing means. It
is likely that relatively young diverse teams deal with this diversity differently than relatively (experienced) old teams.
Conversely, two teams of equal average age can differ widely on the spread in those ages. Consequently, if one hypothesizes on
the impact of high or low average age (for instance on innovativeness) one is implicitly assuming (but not ensuring!) low spreads
around those means; otherwise the effect is lik ly to be 'diluted' by the more extreme team members.  This problem of means and
spreads is hardly acknowledged in the reviewed literature, where mean and diversity effects are simply treated separately.
Anyway, if a methodology is applied that does not properly deal with this problem, re ults are essentially uninterpretable as one
compares apples and oranges. 
A second and related problem concerns the right measurement of variety in a team. Most authors refer to the classic
overview of inequality measures by Allison (1978) when they choose the coefficient of variation (COV i.e. standard deviation
divided by the mean) to measure spread in a team. The main reason they do this is the so-called scale-invariant character of this
measure, which means that it not sensitive to multiplication of each members' score with a constant. This property of a spread
measure is useful when we want to compare for instance an income distribution expressed in yen with one in dollars. Note that
only relative positions are of interest when the COV is used, absolute positions are not. It is our contention that past team
researchers have too easily gone along with the stress on scale invariant measures by (mainly) sociologists, without thinking too
much about its relevance or applicability in their own field of study.  As it happens, in our type of research absolute differences
often do matter. This can be easily shown if we take two (four person) teams with the following tenure distributions: (1 2 3 4)
and (5 10 15 20). We think it is obvious that for instance integration problems because of different dates of entry are highest in
the second team as they differ most in this respect. Still, both teams have the same COV (.45), so they would (incorrectly) b
treated as equally diverse when this measure is used. 
A third issue of empirical nature is the use of very heterogeneous samples in team research. In fact, many studies are cross
sections of the Fortune 500: samples that vary widely in size, industry structure, market conditions, governance structures and
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other confounding variables for which adequate controls are seldom included. It is for this reason, that Hambrick and Mason
(1984) stressed the need either to use single industry samples or matched pair designs. In order to gain more control over
confounding variables, another strategy is offered by Wiersema and Bantel (1992: 115) when they propose to "[r]ely on more
in-depth analysis, such as case studies and experimental research". 
 
5 Summary and conclusion
Although much research has already been done to test various propositions of the upper echelons theory, no clear coherent
picture emerges. This is mainly due to limitations in the way upper echelons research has been approached so far. These
limitations are of both theoretical and empirical nature. Concerning theory and theory development, it was argued that research
has been rather fragmented when viewed from the original upper echelons model. It has focussed on short causal links and has
insufficiently dealt with the competing hypotheses theory sometimes gives rise to. Furthermore, there are interesting aspects of
the model that have hardly been researched, such as psychological team composition and the development or adjustment of team
strategic hoices over time. On the empirical side,  problems exist in the simultaneous treatment of means and spreads of
variables and in the often inadequate control of confounding variables.  
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APPENDIX
Empirical TMT studies
COMPOSITIONAL VARIABLES Authors Sample Findings
A. Average experience
1. Average age Bantel and Jackson (1989) TMTs of 199 banking companies in 6 AmericanNo direct association with innovativeness
2. Average tenure in...
 
  a. team Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven (1990) 92 founding TMTs in the US semiconductor Marginal positive effect of previous joint experience on
 industry performance
  b. organisation Bantel and Jackson (1989) TMTs of 199 banking companies in 6 AmericanOrganisational tenure is not associated with the adoption of
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980Younger teams are more likely to undergo corporate
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980Positive effect of average team tenure on corporate strategic
Smith et al. (1994) TMTs of 53 single-business technology-basedAverage team tenure is not associated with performance or
Finkelstein and Hambrick (1990) TMTs of 100 US companies in the chemical, Longer tenured teams followed more persistent, unchanging
states
Fortune 500 strategic change
Fortune 500 change (counter hypothesis)
companies any intermediate process variable
states innovations
computer and natural gas industry strategies that conform to those of competitors and lead to
performance close to the industry average. Results are
stronger in high discretion environments
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COMPOSITIONAL VARIABLES Authors Sample Findings
 - continued - Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) TMTs of 57 bankrupt and 57 surviving Compared to survivors, bankrupts had lower and declining
3. Average educational  level Bantel and Jackson (1989) TMTs of 199 banking companies in 6 AmericanEducational level is positively associated with the level of
4. Main functional expertise Hambrick and D'Aveni (1992) TMTs of 57 bankrupt and 57 surviving Bankrupts had lower and declining core functional
Michel and Hambrick (1992) TMTs of 134 diversifying Fortune 500 firms TMTs organisational tenure is positively associated with the
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980Lower average organisational tenure is associated with
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980Educational level is positively associated with the amount
Michel and Hambrick (1992) TMTs of 134 diversifying Fortune 500 firms TMTs in firms with high unit inter-dependence have more
companies in 3 industries average team tenures over a 5 year pre-bankruptcy period.
Fortune 500 higher corporate strategic change
states innovation
Fortune 500 of corporate strategic change
companies in 3 industries expertise over time
amount of inter- dependence between firm units but not
with performance. No interaction of tenure and
interdependence on performance.
core functional expertise, but this lowers performance
(counter hypothesis)
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COMPOSITIONAL VARIABLES Authors Sample Findings
B. Experience variety
1. Age variety Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly (1984) 599 top management group members in 31 FortuneIndividuals that are more dissimilar in age from the rest of
2. Tenure variety in...
  
 a. team
  b. organisation
Bantel and Jackson (1989) TMTs of 199 banking companies in 6 AmericanAge heterogeneity is not associated with innovation
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980Age heterogeneity is not associated with corporate strategic
Wiersema and Bird (1993) TMTs of 40 Japanese firms from 4 industries listedAge heterogeneity is positively related to team turnover 
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980No association between team tenure heterogeneity and
Wiersema and Bantel (1993) TMTs of 85 manufacturing firms in the 1980 Team tenure heterogeneity is not associated with team
Wiersema and Bird (1993) TMTs of 40 Japanese firms from 4 industries listedT am tenure heterogeneity is positively related to team
Wagner, Pfeffer and O'Reilly (1984) 599 top management group members in 31 FortuneOrganisational tenure heterogeneity is positively related to
Bantel and Jackson (1989) TMTs of 199 banking companies in 6 AmericanNo association between organisational tenure heterogeneity
500 companies the team are more likely to turn over
states
Fortune 500 change
on the Tokyo Stock exchange
Fortune 500 corporate change
Fortune 500 turnover
on the Tokyo Stock exchange turnover
500 companies team turnover. Distant individuals are more likely to turn
states and innovation
over.
COMPOSITIONAL VARIABLES Authors Sample Findings
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-continued- Hambrick and d'Aveni (1992) TMTs of 57 bankrupt and 57 surviving companies in 3Survivors and bankrupts did not differ on
3. Educational background variety Bantel and Jackson (1989) TMTs of 199 banking companies in 6 American statesNo association between innovation and heterogeneity
Michel and Hambrick (1992) TMTs of 134 diversifying Fortune 500 firms High interdependence firms had higher organisational
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980 No association between organisational tenure
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) TMTs of 47 firms in high (26) and low (21) discretionOrganisational tenure heterogeneity is negatively
Wiersema and Bird (1993) TMTs of 40 Japanese firms from 4 industries listed onOrganisational tenure heterogeneity is not associated
Smith et al. (1994) TMTs of 53 single-business technology-based Tenure heterogeneity is negatively associated with
Wiersema and Bantel (1992) TMTs of 87 manufacturing firms from the 1980 Educational specialization heterogeneity is positively
industries organisational tenure heterogeneity
Fortune 500 heterogeneity and corporate strategic change
contexts associated with performance; more so in high
the Tokyo Stock exchange with team turnover
companies return on investment and the amount of informal
Fortune 500 associated with corporate strategic change
tenure variety TMTs (counter hypothesis); no
performance implications 
discretion contexts
communication.
of educational specialities
  
                                                                                               
COMPOSITIONAL VARIABLES Authors Sample Findings
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-continued- Wiersema and Bantel (1993) TMTs of 85 manufacturing firms in the 1980 FortuneEducational curriculum heterogeneity does not affect
4. Functional variety Michel and Hambrick (1992) TMTs of 134 diversifying Fortune 500 firms TMTs in high interdependence firms had more
5. 'Temporal and occupational variety' Murray (1989) TMTs of 84 Fortune 500 food (58) and oil (26) Temporal heterogeneity enhances long-run performance,
Smith et al. (1994) TMTs of 53 single-business technology-based Heterogeneity in the years of education has a direct
Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) TMTs of 47 firms in high (26) and low (21) discretionMarginal negative effect of functional heterogeneity on
Smith et al. (1994) TMTs of 53 single-business technology-based Functional heterogeneity has direct nor indirect impact
500 turnover
companies positive effect on both ROI and sales growth
contexts performance in high discretion firms
companies on performance
companies between 1967 and 1981 but not short-run performance. No effects in the low
heterogeneous functional backgrounds (counter
hypothesis)
TMT discretion (food) industry. No effects of
occupational variety
                          
TABLE 1
Overview TMT studies on hypothesis level
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Team characteristic # TMT studies # hypotheses % confirmed % no result % counter
hypothesis
Average...
 Age 2 2 50 50 0
 Team tenure 3 6 17 67 17
 Organisational tenure 5 8 75 25 0*
 Educational  level 2 2 100 0 0
 Functional orientation 2 3 67 0 33
Variety of ...
 Age 4 4 50 50 0
 Team tenure 3 3 33 67 0
 Organisational tenure 8 13 31 62 8
 Education 4 8 37 63 0
 Function 2 5 0 80 20*
Total 12 54 41 52 7
 Study by Haleblian and Finkelstein (1993) left out as the characteristic is entered only as a control variable for which no hypothesized effect is stated*
                                                                        Figure 1: Original model (Hambrick and Mason, 1984)
The objective situation
(external and internal)
UPPER ECHELONS
CHARACTERISTICS
(psychological
and observable)
Strategic
choices
PERFORMANCE
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Figure 2: Stylized model of TMT composition effects
TMT
characteristics
Group process
affective effect: social integration
Strategic choices
cognitive effect: knowledge, experience
Performance
